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I. Introduction
Science necessarily involves philosophical approaches to both make sense of its findings
and provide purposeful direction for research. Biology as the scientific approach to the study of
life is, therefore, bound to philosophy, especially regarding questions about the nature and
treatment of life. The cell theory has effectively been a scientific grounding point for the former1
since the nineteenth century, and it has certainly been advantageous for the rapid advancement of
biological research and medical applications. Still, even today scientists are philosophically
divided on the nature of life. Many biologists would likely argue that the difficult philosophical
questions underlying their own discipline—for example, the problem of how one can logically
(i.e. not just descriptively) account for something that is recognized and distinguished as “living”
arising solely from “non-living” or abiotic components—have no place in formal scientific or
biological research because they are not directly testable questions. However, while it may be
true that these questions are not directly testable, researchers in scientific disciplines should not
dismiss such inquiry entirely. Biological research relies—at least legally and financially, if not
ethically—upon effective communication of its knowledge and application of that knowledge to
non-scientific audiences, and awareness of these philosophical questions and proper treatment of
them is essential for proper communication of the sciences to society. In particular, such
philosophical questions are often what motivates and engages new learners to scientific
disciplines, and it is often the case that the more one learns, the more questions one has. For
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The cell theory, credited to Schwann, Schleiden, and Virchow, states that:
• Organisms are composed of cells.
• The cell is the basic unit of life.
• All cells come from preexisting cells

As should be obvious, this theory provides descriptive parameters to account for what we recognize as living
organisms. Without a sufficient account of the origin of the first cell of an evolutionary lineage as an exception to
the rule, the third clause is at risk of an infinite regression.
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example, what constitutes the recognition of a cell or organism as something “alive” and
individual, something that is more than a mere sum of non-living parts? Biology recognizes that
such a distinction between life and non-life exists in nature, but largely still fails to account
satisfactorily for the seemingly paradoxical claim noted above. Thus, as biologists come to
better acknowledge and understand the present philosophical inquiry concerning their content
knowledge, the bonds of education and service between biology and society are strengthened.2
Tangentially, it is worth noting that even founders of modern science and stark proponents of
materialism—such as John Locke—have argued that the link between our sensory experiences of
the natural world and our knowledge of it is not necessarily “direct” by any means,3 and modern
sensory physiology would support this view. One might thus beg the question of how ‘direct’ our
knowledge of the natural world can and should be.
Under the current paradigm, scientific knowledge is held to be the authority of our
understanding of the natural world, but it cannot in its current state address questions of purpose
or value in this domain. However, the scientific project assumes that there are objectively real
values—such as human curiosity, consistency, and the pursuing knowledge of the natural world,
to name a few—and purposes to describe reality. So, as it stands, science has a metaphysical
foundation of values which it fails to validate, being limited primarily to descriptions of the
physical world. Scientism—the claim that scientific knowledge is the most authoritative and/or
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This is especially relevant today with controversy over socioscientific issues such as climate change and stem cell
research.
3 From these perspectives, the link between objects of the material world and the ideas or descriptive accounts we
form of them from sensory experiences is not evidently one of necessity. Locke, for example, has argued that we
only have a relative notion of substance rather than a positive one (Locke 1997—II xxiii 2). Consider something
measured and quantified in science like charge. It is inferred from our sensory experiences and from physical
investigations that such a thing exists in nature and operates in an ordered and describable way, but can we really
say what such a thing is? Sure, charge comes from protons and electrons, and these particles get their charge
presumably from something else, but what essentially is charge? A similar question can be raised for mass.
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the only valuable knowledge—is thus incoherent.4 The question then is whether and how science
and philosophy can somehow be merged in such a way that scientific knowledge is
contextualized and applied towards a search for answers to these deeper questions. The rapidly
emerging field of biosemiotics strives to meet this aspiration.
Marcello Barbieri is one biosemiotician who argues against the dominant paradigm in
science generally and biology especially. In his view, current scientific practice is burdened by
physicalism, as described in science and philosophy at least since the mid-60s by Chargoff and
others (Barbieri, 2007). Barbieri describes physicalism or the physicalist thesis as one which
attempts to account for all phenomena solely in terms of their physical quantities. While this
approach has employed reductionism to great effect in furthering our understanding of natural
causes for phenomena5 , there are significant problems with a physicalist scientific approach.
First, the critique of science in the preceding paragraphs still stands—science is limited to
descriptive causal explanations, but for scientific findings to have significance, human ingenuity
must come into play for their interpretation and application. Without this broadening perspective,
for example, we would have no concept of evolution, the most unifying theory in biology. It is
difficult to imagine a modern biological discipline with current technological advancements and
no concept of evolution—indeed, some might say impossible, for scientific findings influence
the development of technology and vice versa in an ongoing cycle. And it must be admitted that
the physicalist thesis is quite radical, and Barbieri’s critique of the dominant paradigm may be
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A critique often credited to Nietzche in philosophy of science, though his critique of science is more complex
(Babich 2010).
5 With advancements in technology, science is now capable of exploring (albeit indirectly) the natural world on the
subatomic level, yet this is a scale which is almost incomprehensibly smaller than the scale of what is detectable by
and relatable to the human senses; one is left to wonder whether we are approaching the boundaries of what is
knowable at the physical level. Moreover, as the complexity of scientific findings increases in this regard, so too
does the estrangement of science from society and other bodies of knowledge.
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unfair. But, as a theory which might attempt to back the scientific project—and, perhaps even
more dangerous, as a mood which subtly pervades and is propagated by scientific practice and
culture—such stark flaws must be pointed out. The physicalist approach is necessarily limited by
its reductionism to exclude any synthesizing of broader understandings from the scientific body
of knowledge. For biology, were this conceptualization to be carried out to its extremes, the
phenomena of each organism would appear to be isolated, from the microscopic to the
macroscopic level. Every act of DNA transcription and translation to a gene product would seem
independent from another, and ecology would cease to exist as a scientific discipline.
Secondly, it presents an effectively nihilistic outlook.6 This is because science through
the physicalist approach not only distances itself from searching for any sort of transcendental or
supernatural explanation of natural phenomena but discredits them entirely. In other words, if
nothing beyond the realm of physical interactions is held to be ‘objectively real’ or of any
fundamental importance for explaining phenomena except in a very superficial sense, the
tendency may be to assume that there is no objective meaning or purpose in nature, and that life
at any level is thus aimless. The physicalist thesis may permit only wonder at the complex depth
of the human mind, the vast diversity of life and biotic processes on earth, and the very
possibility of communication. It cannot thoroughly explain why these things occur; it can only
concede that they do somehow because of complex physical and chemical interactions which
science strives to describe. In fact, the physicalist thesis holds that there is no why—no
overarching explanation beyond physical interactions. In other words, the physicalist thesis

The view that modern society and science are trending towards nihilism is another of Nietzsche’s famous remarks.
A distinction between two types of nihilism is made clear by Bernard Reginster, where nihilism as disorientation is
the view that there is no objective meaning, purpose, or values that are somehow a priori to life (2006). Nihilism as
despair is the view that there are such objective values, but that they are ultimately unattainable. The former would
seem to apply here.
6
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prevents one from making any broader connections because even these connections in principle
must be reducible to only purposeless physical interactions. As a scientific approach, this
nihilistic embrace is paradoxical because science as a whole assumes that the universe is ordered
and knowable and strives to describe its processes—the same applies in particular to biology and
life processes. Simultaneously, any human values—including the most noble quests for
knowledge and understanding—are undermined.
This is what Barbieri means when he says that modern science does not know how to
cope with the meaning that scientists themselves and society at large nevertheless attribute to
scientific discoveries (2007). He points out a paradox at the core of biology in the following way.
The genetic code is held to be the fundamental basis of all life on Earth; according to the
physicalist thesis, however, it is at most a “metaphor” constructed to make sense of complex but
objectively meaningless physical interactions. Here, I would add that even the recognition of
something as being meaningfully ‘alive’ and originating from abiotic components is paradoxical
under a solely physicalist view. Thus, with the physicalist thesis rendered unsatisfactory, science
is left in want of some other theoretical approach to back its project. Therefore, to realize this
goal and to push the scientific understanding of life, a synthesis of the knowledge and methods
of biology and philosophy becomes necessary. Alone, neither field is capable of effecting
significant change in the current scientific practice, for biology in a strictly scientific sense lacks
the methods, and philosophy lacks access to requisite knowledge and traction in the scientific
community.
Biosemiotics is perhaps the most significant attempt to bridge the gap between science
and philosophy since they started to diverge in the modern era. This emerging field attempts to
find evidence for natural sources of inherent and objective meaning or purpose in biologic life.
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Proving this search to be futile or a worthwhile endeavor is not within the scope of this paper.
Rather, this paper is an attempt to formally introduce biosemiotics and how the methods of
biology and philosophy are synthesized therein to the scientific community it should concern the
most. Furthermore, potential merits and detriments of this approach will be examined through
analysis of the views of Marcello Barbieri who proposed in 1986 that cells have “ribotypes”7
which derive from the evolutionary impacts of early ribozymal entities and that the cell is a
trinity of ribotype, genotype, and phenotype. I will first present a brief account of biosemiotics in
general, noting how it came to be and what some of its prominent views are. I will then narrow
the scope of my focus to the views of Barbieri on the nature of the cell. I will offer a critical
examination of Barbieri’s semiotic model, presenting its strengths and weaknesses in its attempt
to make biosemiotics relevant and viable in application to scientific research. In my opinion,
Barbieri’s view is potentially of critical importance for the direction of biological research and
education, having many component points worthy of both philosophical consideration and
scientific testing. While his basis for the argument of a cell’s ribotype as its codemaker may not
yet be definitively shown, the argument for a cell as a triadic entity seems self-consistent and
plausible; beyond this, it is an interesting and radical conception which could reform our
understanding of the origin of life. Still, even if a cell should be considered as a trinity of
genotype, ribotype, and phenotype as opposed to a duality of genotype and phenotype, the
argument for the cell as a self-contained semiotic system which produces its own meaning seems
open for debate. Ultimately, I see this debate as one of which biologists should be made aware
and to which they should contribute.

This will be explained and expanded upon in a later section, but a cell’s ribotype , defined as the ribonucleoprotein
system of the cell, is essentially classified according to whether it has a prokaryotic (70s) or eukaryotic (80s)
ribosomal system.
7
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II. Biosemiotics in general

Biosemiotics is an attempt to reform our understanding of living systems by breaking
with the view that life processes are essentially meaningless and mechanistic (Mullins, 2017).
This is accomplished through the argument that “semiotic causation” and “semiotic scaffolding”
plays a pivotal role in nearly every aspect of both the internal and external dynamics of
organisms, from cellular processes like metabolism and reproduction to broad scale ecological
processes. One of the clearest and most succinct accounts of this view is offered by Eliseo
Fernandez (2014) in the following manner:

Within each living being there is an unceasing deployment of signaling
interactions between and among its constituent parts. These internal exchanges
are regulated and coordinated with the assistance of another equally complex
semiotic interplay. The second interactional traffic takes place between the whole
organism and the entities and events occurring within its habitat.

To summarize, there are at least two cases of semiosis occurring for every organism: one within
the organism, and one between the organism and its environment.8 Both of these cases are held
to be of equal philosophical merit for the production of new biologic meaning. The richness of
this view becomes clear when terms like “semiotic causation” and “semiotic scaffolding” are
unpacked. To do so, however, semiotic theory and the significant application of the theory to

8

For the purposes of this paper, the former is of primary concern. For any biosemiotics theory to have merit in
modern biology, it would have to first demonstrate plausibility at the microscopic level of the cell, the fundamental
unit of life. To illustrate the proposed applicability of biosemiotics to all biologic study, however, macroscopic cases
of semiosis will be discussed where possible.
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biological systems must first be made clear. At its core, a semiotic system is one that is
concerned with the production of meaning (i.e. semiosis). As such, it takes the fact that meaning
does exist as granted, and the ability for organisms to communicate in any sense is a testament to
that. It should be of no surprise, then, that the theories which arose to account for this
phenomenon were initially concerned rather heavily with linguistics and providing a
sophisticated account of language, for it is the form of communication with which we are most
intimately familiar.

The Saussure-Florkin Model
One semiotic model was developed by Ferdinand de Saussure, which Barbieri describes
as a “duality of ‘signifier and signified’ or ‘sign and meaning’” (2007). In other words, a
semiotic system according to Saussure has two essential components—namely, the sign,
whatever it may be, and the meaning of that sign or what it represents. A good way to explain the
basic relationship is through linguistics with the example of a phoneme. Phonemes are often
depicted by a single letter or a unique pairing of letters, which translates to some vocal utterance.
In this example, a particular phoneme would be considered the “sign” or “signifier,” and the
vocal utterance it translates to would be the “signified.” However, this two-part account of a
semiotic system is still unsatisfactory; being merely descriptive, it leaves open room for debate
as to what links the two parts and how meaning is produced. We are still left in need of a way to
distinguish semiotic systems, which are meaningful, from those that are not. In other words, what
is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be a case of genuine semiosis? Still, this
view was significant in early biosemiotics as shown by the Florkin-Saussure model of 1974
which analogized “sign” to genotype and “signified” to phenotype in cellular systems (Barbieri,
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2007). Barbieri points out that, in stark opposition to what was to come later in contemporary
biosemiotics, Florkin declared that a bioseme carries no meaning, rendering the application of
Saussure’s model useless from a practical standpoint. For the sake of communicating the
conceptual links of the model, however, a biological sign at an ecological scale could be
something like an abundance of resources for an organism. The signified aspect in this case
would be the habitability of the environment to that organism, and perhaps others.9

The Peirce-Sebeok Model
Another major semiotic model—indeed, the most influential and commonly referenced in
biosemiotic scholarship—comes from Charles Peirce. Peirce’s philosophy includes interpretation
as an essential component to the semiotic system, making it a triadic one of “sign, object, and
interpretant” (Barbieri, 2007). To explain by way of linguistics again, consider morphemes—the
simplest units of meaning in language. Any self-contained word, like run, is a free morpheme.10
So, under Peirce’s semiotic account, the sign in an arbitrary case could be a particular morpheme
(e.g. the word run—it could be written or verbal) because it is the interpretable part of the
relationship. The object or referent in this case would be the thing or concept the morpheme
represents in the language (e.g. the actual form of exercise or motion whereby a terrestrial
organism propels itself to some increased velocity through the contact of its limbs with the
ground), and the “interpretant” is the meaningful effect produced by the act of interpretation. For
example, one might see or hear the word “run” (i.e. the sign) in some context, like in a training

Presumably, the organisms are made ‘aware’ of the signified aspect in some sense, but how this is accomplished is
not at this point explicitly clear, hence the need for a more refined model.
9

10

As distinguished from bound morphemes which cannot function independently . Bound morphemes exist in the
form of prefixes and suffixes; they affix new meaning to a word by add ing plurality or action (e.g. the suffixes –s
and –ing would change ‘run’ to ‘runs’ or ‘running’).
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regimen for track and field. One then meaningfully ‘links’ the sign to one’s experience through
the interpretant, in this case by performing the act of running for training—interpretation in
context determines the appropriate response. Accounting for the production of meaning as a
semiotic process in the context of mental activity and language as described above is in fact a
deeply complex philosophical endeavor11 , despite the oversimplification for purposes of analogy.
For this reason, an exhaustive investigation of Peirce’s philosophy is beyond the scope of this
paper, however useful it might be in critiquing the claims of biosemiotics. What is especially of
note from Peirce’s semiotics is that—whether correctly interpreted and applied to biology or
not—a sort of natural teleology arises in Peirce’s semiotic system (Mullins, 2017).
The Peirce-Sebeok model, proposed in 1963 and developed into the 80s, was the first
attempt to apply this understanding to biology and is still a popular model in biosemiotics today
(Barbieri, 2007). Sebeok held that all cases of semiosis are triadic, and that interpretation is a
necessary and sufficient condition for something to be a semiosis—in other words, for something
to be meaningful or have purpose. According to this model, an organism’s genotype is a sign
whose object is the organism’s phenotype, similar to the Saussure-Florkin model. The difference
is that Sebeok holds that there is a self-contained act of interpretation in the system. Thus, at the
most fundamental biologic level, the ribosomal machinery of the cell serves as the source of
interpretation of the genetic code’s meaning which enables the translation of the genetic code.
Interpretation in this case must necessarily be distinguished from a mental act, as it would be
absurd to attribute mental activity to a mere molecular structure. So, in what sense would Sebeok
say a ribosome ‘interprets’ the genetic code? Well, it processes the information contained in
some portion of the genetic code and forms a product, and it does this in a consistent and

For those interested in the philosophy of language and meaning, I would suggest reading Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations especially.
11
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predictable way. A computer program, for example, can be coded to mechanistically ‘interpret’
some input and reliably produce some output according to some algorithm—perhaps
interpretation in the case of ribosomal activity is analogous to this. However, in the case of the
computer program example, would it not be more reasonable to say that the original meaning of
the program came not from the disposition of its mechanistic interpretation, but from the one
who coded it?
In the contemporary biosemiotic view, the telos of any semiotic system is the production
of an interpretant, and this can be realized as the formation of new signs or of habits and
dispositions, among other things (Mullins, 2017). Biosemioticians thus apply a teleology to
living systems and argue for a “dispositional account of causation,” which is, in some sense, a
sophisticated way of reintroducing to modern science Aristotle’s notions of resident causal
powers or intrinsic properties. Fernandez (2015) offers the following summation of the
dispositionalist account:

According to the dispositionalist standpoint an event A causes an event B when
causal powers (which are latent in A) manifest themselves in a well-defined
manner to produce B, contingent upon the occurrence of activating circumstances
of a well-defined kind. For instance, a match has an intrinsic disposition to ignite
which does not become manifest under usual conditions. When specific triggering
circumstances occur (friction, dryness, etc.) the disposition to ignite manifests
itself: the match ignites.

12

So, in the biosemiotic view, the habits of organisms are the dispositions “to respond in a
particular patterned manner when some particular thing or process…triggers that particular
response.” These dispositions are the interpretants of biological semiotic systems (Mullins,
2017). One biosemiotician, Jesper Hoffmeyer (2007), suggests the following:

The apparently purposeful nature of living systems is obtained through a
sophisticated network of semiotic controls whereby biochemical, physiological
and behavioral processes become tuned to the needs of the systems. The operation
of these semiotic controls takes place and is enabled across a diversity of levels.
Such semiotic controls may be distinguished from ordinary deterministic control
mechanisms through an inbuilt anticipatory capacity based on a distinct kind of
causation that I call…‘semiotic causation’ to denote the bringing about of changes
under the guidance of interpretation in a local context.

So, according to Hoffmeyer, the telos of living systems results from semiotic causation, and this
involves interpretation in accordance with the Peirce-Sebeok model. Semiotic causation, then,
appears to be opposed to the causation of abiotic systems because abiotic causation does not
involve interpretation or habit formation. One of the strongest supporting examples of this in
biology may be the discovery of anticipatory cephalic phase responses of the internal milieu of
organisms—especially of the intestinal tract and circulatory systems—which enable control of
things like blood-glucose levels in the face of a discontinuous supply of nutrients (Power and
Schulkin, 2008). For Hoffmeyer, the ability of organisms to anticipate changes in environmental
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or internal conditions and survive through responses to such stimuli is predicated upon this
notion of semiotic causation as being normative for all living systems.
Regarding semiotic scaffolding, Fernandez (2015) quotes recent efforts of Favareau and
Kull to clarify the term. Favareau offers the following account.

Semiotic Scaffolding consists in biologically instantiated sign relations
interlocking with and reinforcing one another, and by so doing, providing
directionality towards and away from other sign relations in the network, through
the dynamic emergence and canalization of semiotic pathway biases and
constraints. Such ongoing semiodynamic re-adjustment enables new scaffolds and
new pathways within and between scaffolds to arise, increasing semiosic capacity
exponentially.

Kull’s suggestion is as follows.

Semiosis as an active meaning-seeking- making process results often with the
building of some relatively static or even quite solid structures that somehow
embed in themselves the findings of that active searching-event of semiosis. The
resulting structure is scaffolding. It canalizes further behavior. It is the frame for
habits.

What I make out of these two somewhat nebulous accounts is that semiotic scaffolding in
biological systems often—though perhaps not always—has to do with the actual physical
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structures that make interpretation and processing of internal or environmental information and
stimuli possible. At one level, examples of semiotic scaffolding could be structures associated
with DNA transcription and translation, like ribosomal complexes and transcription factors; at
another level, examples could be structures associated with autocrine, paracrine, and endocrine
signaling between cells; even further examples could be whole tissues and organ systems, and
perhaps even trends towards cephalization or various body symmetries. Each of these could be
taken as semiotic manifestations of the processes by which living systems meaningfully interact
with information both internally and externally. In addition, the evolution of these structures
would in-turn influence the evolution of increasingly sophisticated responses. Hoffmeyer’s
(2007) remarks on semiotic scaffolding seem to support this interpretation:

History thus not only matters to the cell, but literally operates inside the cell
through the structural couplings—or semiotic scaffolds—that it has served to
build into the system. And this is exactly what distinguishes living systems from
non-living systems: the presence in the former of historically created semiotic
interaction mechanisms which have no counterpart in the latter.

Though Hoffmeyer focuses on the cell’s interior in the above quote, the idea of scaffolding is
applicable to the structures of all living systems; as he says, “The operation of these semiotic
controls takes place and is enabled across a diversity of levels.” Thus, according to semiotic
theory, the semiotic scaffolding manifested in biological structures reflect the telos of living
systems to interpret information and respond through semiotic causation and serve as framework
for the evolution of increasingly complex and adept responses.
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But is the telos of a living system unique by case, or is there something richer about this
view that is somehow fundamental to life? As described thus far, the particular habits formed by
living things would certainly differ. However, Hoffmeyer argues for an aspect of this habit
formation that is common to all living systems (2008). In his view, all living creatures are not
just surviving in accordance with natural selection and responses to their environment—they are
striving also12 . This striving seems to be concordant with the emphasis Michael Polanyi places in
his works as well on the achievements and flourishing of living beings (Mullins, 2017). From a
scientific perspective, though, it is difficult to see how this “striving” is distinct from mere
anthropomorphizing of living systems. It is clear that biosemiotics would argue for a deeper
understanding of the term, but it may not yet be able to express this in a testable way to the
scientific community. As Hoffmeyer himself notes, “making scientifically responsible sense of
this “striving” is one of the challenges that the emerging field of biosemiotics sets out to accept.”
In short, then, the carrying out of a habit or disposition of an organism is seen, in some
general sense, as an act of interpretation of the organism’s surroundings, which is held to be a
telos of living systems. The Peirce-Sebeok model argues in a similar way for a disposition of the
cellular ribosomal machinery. Furthermore, Hoffmeyer explicitly states that “biological
communication is more than just machine- like exchange of information,” and this is “because the
sign embraces a process of interpretation” (2008). To biosemiotics, then, interpretation is
something more than the previous computer program analogy permits, though how exactly this is
to be argued is not quite clear. For while interpretation may be a necessary and sufficient
condition for recognizing a case in which meaning is present, it seems less plausible that this

12

Philosophically, this seems to have echoes of existential philosophers like Nietzsche, Heideggar, and Sartre.
Nietzsche’s concept of will-to-power as a fundamental and normative will of all life to thrive through the exercise
and expansion of ability may be especially applicable here to making sense of this “striving.” Still, this notion seems
far from any scientifically testable justification.
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would be responsible for the production of it, as with the computer program analogy. At the
semiotic level between organism and habitat, like with the example of abundant resources used
previously, this seems to be somewhat less of an issue; mental phenomena are also present in
animals to some extent, and this would presumably be sufficient for the production of meaning in
their responses to environments—the interpretants are the dispositions of the animals themselves.
Still, what about semiotic interplays between whole organisms and environments in cases
without well-documented mental phenomena and complicated neural networks—plants and
bacteria, for example? How are the interpretations of their semiotic interplays fundamentally
different from mechanistic information processing? Clarifying this matter is still a very
challenging area for biosemiotics, especially with regard to cellular processes; Barbieri takes a
somewhat different approach.

III. The Biosemiotic Model of Marcello Barbieri

The Ribotype Theory
Perhaps in anticipation of critiques similar to the challenge raised for the role of
interpretation in the previous section, Barbieri’s semiotic model differs quite significantly from
that of the Peirce-Sebeok model. His argument for inherent meaning in a cell is fundamentally
based on what he originally proposed in 1986 as the Ribotype Theory in which he argues that
cellular “ribotypes” are evidence for natural codemakers rather than mere interpreters. The
Ribotype Theory has three major components. First, it proposes a plausible case for the origin of
the first cells, with their being shaped and brought about by the pre-cellular evolution of early
ribonucleoproteins—what he calls “ribosoids”—and their quasi-replicative abilities. Secondly, it
provides a rough sketch for a potential course of cellular evolution from the protocellular stage to
17

the prokaryotes and eukaryotes observable in the world today which serves to explain, for
example, why prokaryotes and eukaryotes differ in ribosomal makeup (i.e. 70-S vs 80-S
ribosomes, respectively) and in their transcription / translation processes. Thirdly, assuming that
the two above cases or something very near it is true, the Ribotype Theory provides a radically
different perspective on the nature of the cell than what is currently taken for granted in modern
biology. Interestingly, the Ribotype Theory can be viewed as a special case and extension of the
RNA World Hypothesis13 that, if true, leads to a novel conclusion about the nature of the cell. In
this conclusion, Barbieri breaks from the traditional view of cells and organisms as dualities of
genotype and phenotype, offering instead a view of cells as trinities of genotype, “ribotype,” and
phenotype (1986). Interestingly, Barbieri argues that his account on the origin of life is better
than others like the genotype theory and phenotype theory because it avoids the “chicken and the
egg” paradox. In other words, due to their mutual dependence in living systems today, it remains
unclear whether and how a genetic system of information storage could have originated before
the structural development of the referenced information and vice versa. Barbieri attempts to
address this issue through a semiotic account which proposes a role for ribosomal precursors in
cellular evolution.
In this perspective, the cellular ribotype is considered to be a separate entity from
genotype and phenotype that functions to bridge the “one-dimensional” flow of information from
the genetic code to the three-dimensional actualization of that information in the form of proteins
(Barbieri, 1986). This may be a step towards clarifying the issue with interpretation noted above.
More importantly, however, Barbieri argues that these ribosomal complexes are not just

13

First proposed in 1962 by Alexander Rich and conceptually supported by the contributions of Francis Crick and
Carl Woese, the RNA World Hypothesis states that RNA was likely utilized by the earliest life on Earth to store
genetic information and to catalyze chemical reactions (Neveu, Kim, & Benner, 2013).
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translation mechanisms for living systems, but that they were of primary importance in bringing
about the system in the first place—even more so than DNA.14 Furthermore, he holds that
biologic differences in ribosoidal production were the impetus for the characteristic differences
that allow for the modern distinction of prokaryotes from eukaryotes. In other words, he argues
that prokaryotic and eukaryotic cells first arose from natural selection of ribosomal biogenesis
mechanisms with the statement “one ribotype, one cell type” (Barbieri, 1986). The biological
rationale of this account and perspective will be flushed out below in some detail, highlighting
the potential application of modern biological research to test this theory.
Prokaryotes use 70-S ribosomal systems and have their origin of transcription linked in
both time and space to the origin of translation; the two can happen simultaneously (Barbieri,
1986). Eukaryotes use 80-S ribosomal systems and have their origin of transcription separated in
time and space from their origin of translation (nucleus vs. cytoplasm). In the Ribotype Theory,
Barbieri makes a case for ribogenesis mechanisms causing the evolution of this dichotomy, such
that 70-S type ribosomes are evolutionarily streamlined versions of 80-S type ribosomes.
According to Barbieri, the dichotomy that is observed between prokaryotes and eukaryotes
cannot be explained in full by the conclusion put forth by Carl Woese in 1980 that as the
molecular weight of the ribosomal matrix increases, so does the accuracy of the translation; 70-S
ribosomes and 80-S ribosomes differ in weight on average by nearly 2 MDa but have relatively
equal translational accuracies (Barbieri, 1986). Instead, Barbieri thinks that the reason why
prokaryotes with 80-S ribosomes and eukaryotes with 70-S ribosomes are not observed is due to
natural selection on the ribosomal production processes. Specifically, his hypothesis is that the
biogenesis mechanisms of the 80-S ribosomes in eukaryotes allows for their transport from the
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Here, Barbieri comments on and dissents from the assertions of those like Richard Dawkins that organisms are
DNA’s way of producing DNA.
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nucleus to the cytoplasm, which prokaryotic mechanisms would not be able to accomplish
(Barbieri, 1986). This separation in time and space of transcription and translation would allow
for compression and compartmentalization of a larger genome, a greater diversity in cell types,
and eventually multicellularity, evolutionarily balancing the increased energy expenditure for
these ribotypes. In addition, Barbieri proposes that prokaryotes would be able to function with
80-S ribosomes, but that in their case, natural selection favored less energy expenditure,
streamlining the ribonucleoprotein system and restricting the size of the genome. Thus, Barbieri
views the two major ribotype systems that we see today as a sort of natural dichotomy.15 In
addition, a critical factor upon which Barbieri’s theory hinges is recognition of the comparatively
greater metabolic resources given to maintaining a cell’s ribonucleoprotein system than its
genetic code.

Scientific Relevance of Barbieri’s Model

The falsifiable assumptions of the Ribotype Theory are undeniably its most important
aspects from a scientific standpoint and could serve to provide direction for modern cellular and
molecular biological research. Barbieri argues that these falsification tests were beyond the scope
of biology at the time because they would require “detailed elucidation of the structure and
function of the ribosome components, a comparative analysis of the eukaryotic and prokaryotic
ribosome biogenesis, and a precise account of what produces the transport of the eukaryotic
ribonucleoproteins from nucleus to cytoplasm” (1986). Today, however, biology may be close to

Barbieri even goes so far as to say that this “natural dichotomy,” as such, is analogous to that observed in the case
of sex.
15
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a point where it can test this view. In response to a question on the matter of falsification tests for
his theory, Barbieri (1986) provides the following response:

Question 20: Do you regard falsification as an essential attribute of a respectable
scientific theory? If so, what predictions does the ribotype theory make which
could be falsified in the future?

[Response:] Some falsification tests should come from the study of ribosome
biogenesis. The theory implies that the mechanisms which shift the
ribonucleoproteins from nucleus to cytoplasm are intimately associated with the
biogenetic processes, and a detailed comparison of 70s and 80s biogenesis should
reveal if that is indeed the case. It should be possible, for example, to demonstrate
that eukaryotes could not survive with 70s ribosomes because they would be
unable to export them to the cytoplasm.
Other falsification tests may become possible when the function of most
or all ribosomal proteins will be known and the significance of the differences
which exist among various species will be clarified. This should also add much
more substance and content to the relationship between ribotype and cell-type that
is at the basis of the theory.
Finally, we can entertain the idea that one day the manipulation of
ribosomal genes may produce ribosomes which are not just variants of the
existing types but which form a class of their own. In this case the theory predicts
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that we would have the basis for creating in vitro a different type of cell, a really
new form of life.

Barbieri’s response explicitly points out grounds for testing scientifically the plausibility of the
evolutionary roles of ribotypes. He predicts that eukaryotes could not survive with genes for 70s
ribosomes; modern labs may now be capable or very nearly capable of testing this with
recombinant DNA technology and methods available for making transgenic eukaryotes—
consider the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae as a potential model organism for this experiment.
The relative ability of such a transgenic organism to survive could be easily measured against
non-transgenic individuals of the same species.
In response to a question about quasi-replication, Barbieri notes that, while it has
somewhat of a science-fiction flair, such a concept could be tested through the reconstitution in
vitro of natural and artificial ribonucleoproteins (1986). The quasi-replicative ability of
Barbieri’s ribosoids is a critical component of their plausibility as codemakers. Experimenting
with the hypothesis that such characteristics of ribonucleoproteins would emerge in prebiotic
earth conditions prior to self-replication would perhaps be the most direct falsification test of the
Ribotype Theory. Secondly, in his final response to the question, note the proposal for
investigating the possibility of creating synthetic life. Creating synthetic life has not seen much
significant laboratory attention since Miller and Urey’s famous “prebiotic soup” experiment.
Protocell simulations have been developing in recent times, however (Hanczyc, 2011). These
simulations model how primitive cell-like bodies might have looked and behaved in the early
stages of chemical evolution with conditions such as HCN polymer abundance. Such existing
simulation techniques could be coupled with the reconstitutio n of natural and artificial
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ribonucleoproteins in a modern version of Miller and Urey’s experiment to test the Ribotype
Theory and the RNA World Hypothesis by extension. As a founder of synthetic biology,
Stéphane Leduc (1911), said over a century ago,

The synthesis of life, should it ever occur, will not be the sensational discovery
which we usually associate with the idea. If we accept the theory of evolution,
then the first dawn of the synthesis of life must consist in the production of forms
intermediate between the inorganic and the organic world--forms which possess
only some of the rudimentary attributes of life, to which other attributes will be
slowly added in the course of development by the evolutionary action of the
environment.

Connecting the Ribotype Theory to Barbieri’s Overall Semiotic View
Barbieri’s biosemiotic model differs notably from the Peirce-Sebeok model in that
Barbieri’s model entails scientifically testable predictions about the characteristics and
biogenesis of ribosomal complexes in cells. It argues for the recognition of ribotype as separate
from genotype and phenotype and proposes that the evolution of a primitive cellular
ribonucleoprotein system may have been the impetus for the formation of the genetic code. As
such, Barbieri sees fit to equate such a system to a potentially natural “codemaker.” Similar to
the Peirce-Sebeok model in which ribonucleoprotein systems occupied a central role as
interpreters, Barbieri’s model is triadic. However, Barbieri seems to avoid the question of the
origin of biologic meaning with this view of ribotypes as natural codemakers. Thus, the issue of
interpretation as pointed out in regard to the Peirce-Sebeok model is apparently resolved with
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what Barbieri refers to as a separation of the semiotic threshold—the origin of semiosis—from
the hermeneutic threshold—the origin of interpretation (2007).
Some concerns for applications of Barbieri’s Ribotype Theory both in science and as a
semiotic theory may need to be considered further. First, the most glaring limitation of the theory
is that “ribotype class differences” only serve to justify the very general distinctions of organisms
at the basic level of cellular organization which already exist. While it might be exceptionally
useful for reframing understanding of the nature of a cell and thus for biological education, the
ribotype theory cannot be applied with confidence for species’ distinction in a similar manner to
genotype and phenotype in classical genetics. In addition, while Barbieri anticipates the critique,
he still leaves open the question of how to interpret the fact that ribonucleoproteins are encoded
by the genotype and expressed in the phenotype of the cell. Perhaps most significant, Barbieri’s
semiotic model is weaker than the Peirce-Sebeok model in that it rests upon an unverified
understanding of the evolutionary roles of cellular components. If it can be supported, it may
result in a stronger biosemiotic claim, and its strength lies in its applicability to scientific
research. Whereas the Peirce-Sebeok model makes fewer assumptions about the nature of the
cell and simply strives to make sense out of the scientific knowledge currently available, its
reach and potential impact are also weakened by its lack of scientifically testable components.

IV. Conclusion

The basics of contemporary approaches in biosemiotics to making sense of living systems
have hopefully been sufficiently presented. Perhaps the most important distinction to make
between current biologic practice and biosemiotics is that, in the latter, recognition of purposeful
functions in living systems is viewed not as a fault or fantasy of human conception, but as a
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justified awareness of an essential and emergent characteristic that is common to all life—both
microscopic and macroscopic. Barbieri’s unique semiotic model has also been analyzed against
the more common Peirce-Sebeok model, and it has been shown that Barbieri’s Ribotype Theory
is applicable to scientific research—namely, in origin of life simulations that would parallel
Miller and Urey’s experiments. In general, one of the most significant effects of a biology
backed by biosemiotics could be a sophisticated justification of research guided by a search for
purpose in living systems. For example, in the context of biosemiotics, Barbieri’s Ribotype
Theory calls for a further investigation of the purpose of a cell’s ribonucleoprotein system; if
purpose is similarly associated with all biological structures and systems, every aspect of life
calls for investigation with renewed vigor. The danger, of course, is that such a biology may get
lost trying to contextualize meaning where none exists. Furthermore, it would likely struggle to
handle the increased risk of introducing bias in formal research.
In no way does this paper attempt to argue for a reformation of formal scientific or
biologic methods of research. Rather, this project is an attempt to foster discussion of the roles of
science and philosophy, and whether there is to be any overlap therein. Furthermore, it is an
attempt to alert biologists to the developing field of biosemiotics and some of its potential merits
as a budding area which calls for deeper scientific inquiry. Many questions, therefore, remain
unanswered. Is it worthwhile to breakdown the modern divide between science and the
humanities, and if so, in what respects? To what extent can non-scientific bodies of knowledge
can be useful to scientific practice and applications?
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